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Abstract. Here, we present some results in continuation of [1], [3]. 
 
First Comment (Perspectives) 
In [1] we prove   
“I cannot be certain that I am a machine, even in the case that I am a machine”* 
It is imaginable by new progresses (for example new progresses in neuroscience) 
we will be convinced about we are not but a machine. It means, scientists show us 
in a clear way how we think, how we feel, how we decide, … and actually 
everything about us. More exactly, they show all is done by a machine. 
We call this situation “Possible Physicalism situation” or “Possible Physicalism 
perspective”. 
In this situation, what will be the value of the assertion *? 
Hence, if someone proves in a clear way that “I am a Machine” (or “I” is a 
machine), we have another situation in which we prove no one could be sure that 
he is a machine, more specifically the situation that we compare two machines. 
In brief, by considering different situations (perspectives, approaches or stand points) to 
the problem, again we cannot be certain that “I am a machine”. 
Anyway, we have an inconsistency here. The above assertions seems true, unless 
We find a reason to prefer one standpoint to the other, in any aspect. But in any 
stand point we prefer exactly that stand point (If not, we change it). So we are not 
able to prefer one to the other absolutely. 
In [2] we provide some reasons to defend the perspective which defend (*). It is a 
defense based on the morality. We call this view, “Morality perspective”.  
Seemingly, the comparison between these perspectives does not lead us to prefer 
absolutely one to the other. Therefore, it is very possible that we have a 
contradiction in the future. Again, based on this contradiction, we will not be 
certain that we are machines. 
Nevertheless, even in the case that we are not machines and we do not prove it, 
It seems we are able to make this situation for computers with simulation. So the 
problem and contradiction could be created. 
Second Comment (Definability of Mind) 
In the proofs in [1], [3] it is easy to check if we put the word “My Mind” 
instead of “I”. The proofs are repeated and we have  
“I cannot be certain that “My Mind” is a machine, even in the case that my mind 
is a machine”** 
As a conclusion we have the following assertion for Mind in general. 
“I cannot be certain that “Mind” is a machine, even in the case that my mind is a 
machine”** 
In all above, we have a generalized term “Mind”. As a hypothesis, we accept the 
existence of this term. By considering some ideas like some type of solipsism, it is 
possible that we do not know this term as a legal term. In sum, all above are the 
results when we consider mind as a legal term, and this is related to our 
approach. 
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